What happened?
On 4 August, the 28th ASEAN Regional Forum ministers appointed Brunei's Second Minister of Foreign Affairs, Erywan Yusof, as the Special Envoy to Myanmar. Reuters, on 7 August, referred to a statement by the envoy saying: "The planned travel to Myanmar is in the works, and we need to make sure we're fully prepared, unlike the visit I had in June. He even stated that during his next ASEAN visit to Myanmar, he will seek a more substantial dialogue, while emphasizing the importance of allowing him full access to all sides." Earlier, on 1 August, Myanmar's military ruler Min Aung Hlaing expressed his "willingness to engage with ASEAN."

On 6 August, the US State Department released a statement by Secretary of the State expressing grave concern about the military coup in Myanmar and calling on the ASEAN "to unite in urging the military to cease the violence, release all those who have been wrongfully jailed, and resume Myanmar's democratic path."

What is the background?
First, the ASEAN response to Myanmar. Given its shared border with Myanmar, Thailand has the greatest stakes. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have been the most active and vocal in criticizing the Tatmadaw's control. The Philippines government's reactions have been chaotic. On the other hand, Brunei, the current chair of ASEAN, has been quiet as it seeks to convene discussions amongst other ASEAN members. Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have registered muted responses. As a regional organization, the reactions of the ASEAN to the coup reflect the region's diverse national systems and outlook. It ranged from attempts to mediate an internal deal in Myanmar to near-total silence.

Second, ASEAN's five-point consensus on Myanmar. The five-point consensus arrived in April 2021 aimed at addressing Myanmar's deteriorating socio-political crisis and find a peaceful solution. It called for the cessation of violence, facilitation of constructive dialogue with the National Unity Government and other parties, the deployment of an ASEAN Special Envoy, the facilitation of humanitarian aid, and a visit by an ASEAN Special Envoy. Despite the repeated failed attempts for a consensus, it is hailed as a step towards a political solution to the situation at the time.

Third, the ineffectiveness of ASEAN in dealing with Myanmar. While many perceive ASEAN as the obvious political entity to lead efforts to find a political solution to the problem, it has a long history of refusing to do so. Especially in terms of international relations, the General seizing power leaves ASEAN with a reduced role as well as the ability to contain an increasingly assertive China, which seems to leave them hanging over the bridge.

Fourth, Myanmar's response. As part of the five-point consensus that the military government has agreed to, the Tatmadaw has helped in narrowing down the final ASEAN communique through negotiations. They have even requested the ASEAN members to provide them with the freedom to deliver aid to the humanitarian workers. Whereas the Myanmar civil society organizations express great displeasure with ASEAN for their lack of inclusive decision-making and passivity in the face of some of the region's most heinous atrocities.

What does it mean?
First, the crisis in Myanmar is too hot for the ASEAN to handle, causing reputational costs. Second, ASEAN is no stronger than its weakest link since members stay aloof, not allowing them to act decisively. Third, Myanmar's military administration will approach the five-point consensus and the ASEAN-led diplomatic process a la carte, delaying and complying with the envoy as needed to buy time and consolidate power.